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There is widespread concern in Europe and other refugee-
receiving continents that living in an enclave of coethnics hin-
ders refugees’ economic and social integration. Several European
governments have adopted policies to geographically disperse
refugees. While many theoretical arguments and descriptive stud-
ies analyze the impact of spatially concentrated ethnic networks
on immigrant integration, there is limited causal evidence that
sheds light on the efficacy of these policies. We provide evidence
by studying the economic integration of refugees in Switzerland,
where some refugees are assigned to live in a specific location
upon arrival and, by law, are not permitted to relocate during the
first 5 y. Leveraging this exogenous placement mechanism, we
find that refugees assigned to locations with many conationals
are more likely to enter the labor market. This benefit is most
pronounced about 3 y after arrival and weakens somewhat
with longer residency. In addition, we find that, among refugees
employed by the same company, a high proportion share nation-
ality, ethnicity, or language, which suggests that ethnic residential
networks transmit information about employment opportuni-
ties. Together, these findings contribute to our understanding of
the importance of ethnic networks for facilitating refugee inte-
gration, and they have implications for the design of refugee
allocation policies.
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economic integration
S ince spring 2015, more than 2 million displaced persons haveapplied for asylum in Europe (1). When refugees and immi-
grants first arrive in a new country, they often choose to live with
earlier immigrant cohorts in geographically concentrated “eth-
nic enclaves” (2). Across Europe, this residential pattern has
raised concerns about segregation and balkanization. For exam-
ple, at the peak of the refugee crisis, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel declared that “those who seek refuge with us also have
to respect our laws and traditions, and learn to speak German”
and concluded that “multiculturalism leads to parallel societies,
and therefore multiculturalism remains a grand delusion” (3).
Although immigrants from low-income countries tend to make
significant progress in terms of employment rates and earnings
during their first decade after arrival, over the long term, they
continue to lag behind otherwise similar natives (4–7). The belief
that living in an enclave of coethnics or conationals hinders
economic and social integration by making it more difficult for
newcomers to acquire the host country’s language and norms
is widespread. In fact, several countries use policies specifically
designed to geographically disperse asylum seekers (8). In Ger-
many, asylum seekers lose their financial support if they leave
the federal state to which they were initially assigned. In Switzer-
land, asylum seekers and refugees with subsidiary protection are
not allowed to move from their assigned canton, and, in Den-
mark, Sweden, and The Netherlands, asylum seekers who rely
on public housing assistance are geographically dispersed.
Refugees are often among the most vulnerable immigrant
groups, facing the steepest barriers to economic and civic inte-
gration. However, despite the prevalence of policies designed to
prevent refugees from moving to ethnic clusters, there is little
causal evidence of the long-term consequences of these poli-
cies. Ethnic clusters have the potential to be beneficial. Previous
research suggests that coethnics form social networks (9, 10),
and networks reduce search costs and problems with asymmetric
information in the labor market (11, 12). Hence, ethnic clusters
can give immigrants access to networks that provide information
about job openings and job referrals. A sociological literature
also suggests that participation in the “enclave economy”—a
spatial cluster of businesses owned by coethnics—enables immi-
grants to improve their economic status faster than the secondary
labor market of the host society (13, 14). These effects are par-
ticularly pronounced for immigrants who are not fluent in the
local language. For refugees, the social network an ethnic clus-
ter provides may also help them cope with heightened stress
and anxiety during the asylum process, which might also improve
their employment prospects (15).
Comparatively little research has focused on the effects of eth-
nic clusters for refugees specifically, and the evidence so far is
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mixed. Studies from Denmark and Sweden have found positive
effects on earnings for refugees living in an enclave (16, 17), but
no impact on employment, suggesting that enclaves improve the
match between job and worker rather than increase employment
rates (17). Focusing on Germany, ref. 18 finds positive effects on
employment, but the gains decrease rapidly over time. The study
also finds negative effects on wages, suggesting that network-
generated referrals facilitate access to lower-paying jobs. Related
research has also examined the impact of enclave characteris-
tics, such as average welfare dependence, tenure, educational
level, and criminal conviction rate on refugees’ integration
outcomes (19–22).
When trying to isolate the causal effect of ethnic clusters on
employment outcomes, researchers face the problem that the
place of residence or work is not randomly assigned. Instead,
refugees selectively move closer to an ethnic cluster if they expect
to benefit from its networks, and they search for work elsewhere
if they expect to find better jobs outside of the enclave economy.
Hence, if we find that refugees living in a municipality with many
coethnics have a higher probability of employment than those in
municipalities with few coethnics, we cannot conclude that these
differences are caused by the cluster, because the self-selection
into clusters ensures that these groups differ on many important
confounding characteristics, such as human capital endowment,
motivation, or host country language skills. These endogenous
residential location choices confound many existing comparisons
of refugees inside and outside of the enclave (important excep-
tions include refs. 16–18 and 20). A second issue is that the short-
and long-term effects of living in an ethnic cluster may differ,
but, since refugees are free to move after the initial placement
in most countries, it is hard to estimate these effects while keep-
ing constant both the sample of movers and nonmovers and the
exposure to the cluster.
In this study, we address these issues and expand on previous
research along 3 dimensions. First, we leverage a placement pol-
icy for asylum seekers in Switzerland. Refugees with subsidiary
protection in our study sample are exogenously placed across
the 26 Swiss cantons and also have to live and work in their
assigned canton for a minimum of 5 y. Given that the refugees
in our sample are not able to influence the canton assignment,
and that the number of coethnics will vary depending on the
canton, we can isolate the effect of living in an ethnic clus-
ter. Unlike previous studies, where refugees can move after the
initial placement, these refugees have to stay, and are thereby
exposed to the same coethnics for several years. This allows us
to track the dynamics of employment gains from ethnic clus-
ters over time. Distinguishing between short-term and long-term
effects is important, because it could very well be the case that
refugees can find work quicker in the enclave economy than
in the primary labor market, but the medium- and long-term
effects are negative (23). For example, one could imagine that
refugees who get a job through ethnic networks get “trapped”
in a low-wage job or have fewer incentives to learn the host
country language, and therefore receive lower long-term returns
to human capital than refugees who find work outside of the
network.
Second, we combine this natural experiment with registry
data from the State Secretariat of Migration (SEM) that cov-
ers the universe of asylum seekers who arrived between 1994
and 2017. The SEM data provide information on their demo-
graphic background, the outcome of their asylum process, and
their employment status at the end of each year. Unlike previ-
ous studies, we observe refugees directly after arrival, namely,
before they have received residence permits. We can thereby
track their employment status from the start, to examine the
dynamic effects of coethnic networks. In addition to the binary
employment indicator, our data also contain information about
the type of work refugees perform, a unique employer ID, and
the start date of their employment contract. This allows us to
identify refugees employed in the same sector and by the same
employer and thereby shed light on the channels through which
ethnic networks operate.
Third, previous research shows that ethnolinguistic similarity
is important for the formation of social networks (e.g., ref. 9).
While previous studies on ethnic enclaves have defined ethnic
networks using conationality as a marker of a shared background
(16–18, 20), our detailed data give us the opportunity to examine
the robustness of the network effects using 3 alternative mea-
sures. We measure the number of network members based on
either nationality, ethnicity, or language, to examine if they differ
in importance for refugees’ employment prospects.
We find that spatially concentrated ethnic networks have a
small but positive effect on refugees’ employment levels. In par-
ticular, assigning refugees to a canton with a 10% higher number
of conationals increases their employment rate at the end of
the third year after arrival by about 2% on average. This net-
work effect peaks after 3 y, but remains positive up to 5 y after
arrival. The effects for our network measures based on ethnicity
and language are very similar. Looking at conationals who have
been hired by the same company, we see that the share is dispro-
portionally high compared with the share of conationals within
the same work sector in the same canton, supporting the notion
that newly arrived refugees receive employment information
through their conational network. Again, the results are virtu-
ally identical when using ethnicity- or language-based network
measures.
Institutional Background
Asylum seekers in Switzerland are initially housed in a few
centralized processing centers, and then are transferred to can-
tons within 90 d of arrival. The assignment to cantons is done
manually at SEM headquarters, without any personal interac-
tion between the allocation officer and the asylum seeker. By
law, the allocation to the cantons is proportional to population
size, and, since 1998, there are also requirements to balance
asylum seekers’ country of origin across cantons. While wait-
ing for the decision on their asylum claim, a lengthy process
that takes, on average, about 2 y for those who ultimately
receive protection, asylum seekers have to reside in the assigned
canton. They are permitted to work after 3 mo (see ref. 15
for details), and the employer must contact the corresponding
cantonal authority to apply for a work permit for the asylum
seeker. Some cantons impose restrictions on the sectors refugees
can work in.
Most applicants who are not deported receive either sub-
sidiary protection (F permit) or refugee status according to the
Geneva Convention (B permit). Individuals with an F permit
can apply for a B permit after 5 y, and immigrants can apply
for a permanent residence permit (C permit) after 5 to 10 y.
Even after receiving an F permit, refugees with subsidiary pro-
tection are not allowed to live or work in a canton other than
the one to which they were originally assigned.
∗
After receiv-
ing a B permit, refugees can apply to move to another canton,
and the application can only be denied if the applicant is highly
dependent on welfare benefits. In our analysis, we focus on asy-
lum seekers who received an F permit and were therefore not
allowed to move from their assigned canton for at least 5 y after
arrival.
Materials and Methods
Data and Measures. We draw upon 2 sets of register panel data to identify
the effect of coethnic networks on refugee employment. First, we leverage
*Requests to transfer to another canton are rarely granted, unless they concern family
reunification or health issues.
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the ZEMIS (central migration information system) database from the SEM,
which tracks all individuals who applied for asylum between January 1994
and December 2017 and were subsequently granted subsidiary protection.
The data contain detailed information on the applicants’ date of arrival,
processing center, assigned canton, asylum decision, date of the decision,
and demographic characteristics, such as country of citizenship, age, and
gender, as well as self-reported ethnicity, language, and religion. Impor-
tantly, the SEM also collects information on the number of days individuals
have continuously been employed at the end of each year and a unique
employer number. In addition, and only starting in April 2008, the data
also contain information about whether special considerations required
assignment to a particular canton (e.g., family members who arrived ear-
lier or health issues that necessitate treatment in a particular hospital).
We exclude cases with approved requests to be assigned to specific can-
tons, and only focus on those individuals whose assignment was exogenous
(see below). Given our focus on employment, we also restrict the sam-
ple to the working age population, i.e., refugees between 18 and 65 y of
age at arrival. We also focus on asylum seekers who received an F permit
and arrived between 2008 and 2013, so that we can track their integra-
tion trajectories over the first 5 y after arrival. After 5 y, asylum seekers
and refugees with subsidiary protection can apply for a residency permit
that allows them to move across cantons, and their employment outcomes
are no longer consistently updated in the database. Our use of the ZEMIS
data was governed by a data use agreement with the SEM and did not
require informed consent and institutional review board approval, given
the nature of the data. We were granted permission to analyze the data
and freely publish the results, but are not allowed to share the data with
third parties. Researchers who want to access the data need to request
it from the SEM. Our replication code files are posted in a dataverse at
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FXVVDQ (24).
Second, we measure ethnic clusters in 3 ways, defined as the number of
immigrants in the assigned canton and year who have a shared nationality,
ethnicity, or language. Our preferred measure defines the ethnic network
by the number of conationals. To calculate the number of immigrants with
shared nationality for each canton and year, we combine the information
on country of origin from ZEMIS (F permits) with population-wide registry
data for all immigrants (with B or C permits) living in Switzerland using
data from PETRA (foreigner registry until 2009) and its successor registry,
STATPOP (registry of all residents, from 2010 onwards). Combining these
3 data sources allows us to measure the size of the network based on all
immigrants, both refugees and other types of immigrants. In addition, the
origin variable in the ZEMIS data is nonmissing for nearly all refugees. As
an alternative, we also measure the size of the network by the number of
immigrants with shared ethnicity or language living in a specific canton.
For this, we leverage information on immigrants’ self-reported language
and ethnicity. Note that this information is only available from ZEMIS, and
therefore the network only covers refugees arriving in 1994 and onward
who received an F, B, or C permit. It does not cover all immigrants living in a
specific canton in a given year. In addition, some individuals lack information
on ethnicity and language, and therefore the samples for the analysis based
on coethnic and colinguistic network members are somewhat smaller than
the sample we can use for the conational definition of the network.
SI Appendix, Table S1 shows summary statistics for our sample. The aver-
age age at arrival is 28 y, a third of the sample consists of women, and close
to one-fifth arrive with a child (family members younger than 18 y). The
individuals in our sample waited 2.3 y, on average, to receive their F permit,
and the average number of conationals in their canton is 570.
While individuals with an F permit are restricted from moving, migrants
who moved to Switzerland with a work or study visa, as well as those with
a B or C permit, are typically free to locate as they wish. We therefore
observe geographic variation for different origin groups. As an example,
Fig. 1 shows that the number of conationals varies by canton for asylum
seekers from Iraq and Somalia. Around 90% of the refugees in our sample
originate from Eritrea, China (Tibet), Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria, Sri Lanka,
or Iraq (SI Appendix, Table S2).
Exogenous assignment. The allocation to cantons is done manually by
placement officers in the SEM headquarters, without any personal inter-
action with the asylum seeker. Hence, any potential selection must be
based on the observable characteristics of the asylum seekers recorded
in ZEMIS. We have access to the same ZEMIS database and thereby
observe the same applicant information as is available to the SEM offi-
cers in charge of assignment. Because we condition on the observable
characteristics, placement should be exogenous to individuals’ unobserv-
able characteristics. The headquarters assigned around 60 cases a day over
the years 2008–2013 with a very small team of placement officers, sug-
100
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Fig. 1. Number of residents from Iraq or Somalia (by canton), measured
in 2013.
gesting that there is little time to optimize on asylum seekers’ individual
characteristics.
To test the assumption that assignment is balanced on characteristics
not observed by the placement officer, we examine whether a variable
not yet realized at the time of assignment, namely the time refugees
wait for a decision on their asylum claim, is related to the size of the
conational (coethnic or colinguistic) network. The wait time is likely to
be related to individuals’ backgrounds and protection claims. Previous
research has also found that wait time has an independent and substantial
effect on refugees’ subsequent employment chances (15). In SI Appendix,
Table S3, we examine whether wait time (measured as the log number
of days between submission of the asylum application and decision date)
is related to the number of network members in the assigned canton.
For this, we condition on arrival year and origin country, since the size
of the network and expected wait time will vary by country and over
time. We find no evidence that wait time is related to the size of the
network. We also find that the results are robust when conditioning on
processing center and canton fixed effects (these are the predictors we
condition on in the main specification). These tests corroborate our quali-
tative insights from interviews with the assignment officers, which convey
that the allocation is indeed quasi-random and unrelated to unobservable
characteristics.
Statistical analysis. To estimate the impact of being assigned to a can-
ton with a large network, we regress refugees’ employment outcomes on
the log number of conationals in the assigned canton. We control for
the refugees’ country of origin, since the number of conationals varies by
country. The number of conationals will generally be higher in cantons
with a larger population, but these cantons also differ on other char-
acteristics that may affect employment chances. Hence, we also include
canton fixed effects and identify the network effect from within-canton
variation in network size between different nationalities. To account for
the fact that geographical proximity of the processing center can affect
the canton assignment, we control for the center and year of arrival.
We also condition on the individual characteristics observable to the SEM
headquarters at the point of assignment to eliminate potential omitted
variable bias, as well as canton level characteristics. This allows us to
attribute differences in employment levels to differences in the number of
conationals.
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Our benchmark model has the following equation:
yickt = β1ln(Matchck,t−1 + 1)+
5∑
q=2
γq {Years in CHit = q}
+
5∑
q=2
ζq({Years in CHit = q} · ln(Matchck,t−1 + 1))
+ β2Xickt + θk + θc + θt + εickt ,
where our main outcome yickt is a dummy variable indicating whether
individual i from country c in assignment canton k is employed in year t;
ln(Match+ 1) measures the logged number of conational immigrants in
the assigned canton in year t − 1, and we interact this variable with indi-
cators that mark each individual’s first 5 y in the country, {Years in CH= q},
where the arrival year, q = 1, is the reference category. Therefore, β1 and
ζq capture the employment effects of being placed in a canton with a
higher number of conationals in each of the first 5 y after arrival. Xickt is
a matrix of control variables including an intercept, age at arrival, age at
arrival2, woman, married, arriving with a child, family size, processing cen-
ter, processing center interacted with year, an indicator for French-speaking
immigrants assigned to French-speaking cantons, dummies if a preference
for German or French speaking cantons is expressed in the case file sent
to the assignment office, and the cantonal unemployment rate and log
number of immigrants. We also include fixed effects for self-reported eth-
nicity, language, and religion. Finally, we include fixed effects for arrival
year (θt), assignment canton (θk), and country of citizenship (θc) to eliminate
the influence of common shocks and time-invariant unobserved nationality
or canton-specific confounders. Standard errors are clustered at the can-
ton level. To assess the robustness to alternative measures of the size of
the ethnic network, we also replicate the models using the logged number
of immigrants with a shared ethnicity or a shared language instead of the
number of immigrants with a shared nationality.
Results
Fig. 2, Top Left shows the marginal effects of being assigned to a
canton with a higher number of conationals on the probability of
employment in each of the first 5 y after arrival (see SI Appendix,
Tables S4–S7 for the regression results). We find that being
assigned to a canton with a larger existing network of conationals
positively affects the probability of employment in the arrival
year (year 1) and peaks 3 y after arrival. This network effect is not
only statistically significant but also economically meaningful: A
10% increase in the number of conationals increases employ-
ment by 0.3% points (P value: 0.001; 95% CI: 0.12 to 0.42) 3 y
after arrival. This corresponds to a 2% increase over the average
employment rate in the same year. Fig. 2, Top Center and Top
Right shows the corresponding effects using shared ethnicity and
language as the basis for the network measure. The pattern for
the coethnic and colinguistic networks are qualitatively similar to
the estimates from the nationality-based measure.
Fig. 2, Bottom Left shows the predicted employment rate for
refugees assigned to a canton where the number of conationals
is either at the 25th or 75th percentile. This illustrates the tem-
poral dynamics and magnitude of the estimated network effects.
These results show that refugees assigned to an area with many
conationals find employment faster than those assigned to can-
tons with few conationals. Three years after arrival, when most
asylum seekers have received their subsidiary protection status,
the employment rate increases for those assigned to cantons with
few conationals, and the effect of the conational network slightly
decreases. Around 40% are employed in the fifth year. Again, we
find a very similar pattern for shared ethnicity and language, pre-
sented in Fig. 2, Bottom Center and Bottom Right. In SI Appendix,
we also replicate the model to examine the effects on alterna-
tive outcomes. We find that a higher number of conationals also
increases the probability of being employed at least 90 d each
year, which is the maximum probation period for most jobs, but
has no differential effect on the probability of working in the
high-skill sector (SI Appendix, Tables S4–S7). We obtain sim-
ilar effects when examining the overall average impact of the
conational network, without using the interaction with years
since arrival (SI Appendix, Table S8).
Fig. 2. (Top) The estimated marginal effect of being assigned to a canton depending on the log number of network members (based on shared nationality,
ethnicity, or language) on refugee employment by year of arrival, with 95% CIs. Year 1 corresponds to the arrival year. (Bottom) The predicted employment
rates for refugees assigned to cantons with a low or high number of network members (i.e., 25th vs. 75th percentile), with 95% CIs. Both rows are estimates
from the benchmark regression model (see Statistical analysis for details).
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What mechanisms might account for these network effects?
While we do not observe how refugees find employment, we
know which refugees are employed by the same company, and
we can calculate the number of network members with shared
nationality, ethnicity, or language who have been employed by
the same company in the past.† Looking at the nationality of an
individual’s coworkers, we see that around 60% of the employed
individuals in our sample had worked for a company which
had already employed at least one other individual from the
same country (SI Appendix, Fig. S1). The results for ethnic- and
language-based networks are similar. While this pattern is sug-
gestive of network effects, it is also possible that it simply reflects
the fact that refugees from the same origin countries are clus-
tered in the same work sectors, perhaps due to similar skill sets.
To examine this, Fig. 3 shows the share of all individuals previ-
ously employed by an individual’s firm with common nationality,
ethnicity, or language. We then compare this to the share of all
employed refugees in the canton who belong to the same group,
as well as the share employed within the same work sector.
Clearly, the share of conationals employed by the same firm is
disproportionally high compared with the share of conationals
employed within the same sector (and different companies),
which is consistent with the hypothesis that refugees obtain infor-
mation about jobs through conational networks. We also conduct
a permutation test (SI Appendix, Fig. S2) where we random-
ize all matches of firms and individuals and stratify on gender
and arrival year to Switzerland, as well as those who start a
new employment in the same year, canton, and sector. The
average share of conational coworkers following the random-
ization is around 0.23, compared with our observed value at
0.36. The same relationship holds for our ethnic and linguis-
tic measures of the networks (SI Appendix, Fig. S2, Center and
Right). This further strengthens our argument that one chan-
nel by which networks facilitate labor market integration is by
providing information about jobs.
We conduct several robustness tests. First, on top of excluding
individuals with approved requests to be assigned to a spe-
cific canton, we also exclude those who make requests that are
not approved (SI Appendix, Table S9). This reduces the sample
size and lowers statistical precision, but we still find significant
effects on employment during the first 3 y. Second, we find
that the results are robust to adding different control variables
step by step, as well as canton by country specific fixed effects
and canton-specific time trends to account for unobserved con-
founders that vary linearly in each canton (SI Appendix, Table
S10). Third, we find similar results when we expand the sample
and include all refugees who are only observed for 3 or 4 y instead
of 5 y (SI Appendix, Table S11). Fourth, we explore heterogene-
ity across subgroups and find that the positive network effects are
concentrated among women and young individuals (SI Appendix,
Table S12). In general, women are less likely to be employed
during the period (8% employment rate compared with 24% for
men). The fact that they benefit more from networks is consistent
with previous studies that have found that networks are more
important for disadvantaged groups (11). Young individuals, on
the other hand, are probably more likely to actively search for
a job and thereby benefit from the networks. Fifth, we find no
consistent evidence that the degree of heterogeneity in terms of
ethnic and linguistic diversity moderates the conational network
effects, although these tests are low-powered given that origin,
ethnicity, and language are correlated (SI Appendix, Tables S13
and S14). Sixth, we find that the results are robust to using a
†For each unique individual—employer observation in our sample, we calculate the num-
ber of conational (coethnic or colinguistic) coworkers as the total number of individuals
from the same group (minus one) who were employed by the same company at any
point between 1994 and the year the specific individual was hired.
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Fig. 3. Share of network members among coworkers. The figure shows
the average share of network members based on either refugees previ-
ously employed by an individual’s firm, all previously employed refugees
in the individuals’ canton, or all previously employed refuges within the
individuals’ canton and work sector. Black lines indicate 95% CIs.
wild cluster bootstrap (SI Appendix, Table S15). Finally, we per-
form an additional falsification test to confirm that the effects
are indeed driven by the number of conationals rather than by
placement in a canton with many nonconational immigrants, who
may affect the local labor market. Instead of measuring the net-
work as the number of conationals, we define it as the number
of immigrants (with F, B, or C permits) who are not conationals.
As expected, we find no significant effect of the number of non-
conational immigrants on employment outcomes (SI Appendix,
Table S16).
Conclusion
Policymakers in refugee-receiving countries are often concerned
that living in an ethnic enclave hinders refugees’ economic and
social integration. Based on this belief, several European gov-
ernments have adopted policies specifically designed to disperse
asylum seekers and balance the ethnic composition of refugees
across geographic areas. Leveraging an exogenous placement
mechanism and registry data covering all refugees who obtained
subsidiary protection in Switzerland between 2008 and 2013, we
find that being assigned to live and work in areas with many
coethnics actually facilitates refugees’ entry into the labor mar-
ket. These employment effects peak around 3 y after arrival
and dissipate somewhat with longer residency. We also find that
refugees who live in ethnic clusters are more likely to have full-
year employment, and that this effect persists for at least 5 y after
arrival.
These findings contribute to our theoretical understanding of
the importance of ethnic networks on refugee integration and
have implications for the design of refugee allocation policies. For
theory, the results provide evidence that access to ethnic networks
can catalyze refugees’ economic incorporation. Unlike previous
studies, which find no long-run effect on employment (17) or
effects that decrease over time (18), our results indicate bene-
fits in the short term and, at least, medium term. Furthermore,
we do not find any evidence that ethnic networks disproportion-
ally increase employment in low-skill jobs.Hence, our findings are
difficult to square with the hypothesis that ethnic clusters provide
only access to exploitative jobs and that refugees would achieve
higher economic mobility outside of the cluster (23).
Our results also have implications for policy, highlighting
one cost of allocation policies aiming to geographically dis-
perse refugees. By making it more difficult for newly arrived
refugees to tap into social networks of conationals, host coun-
tries are decreasing their employment chances. Moreover, at
least in our study context, these policies not only dampen refugee
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employment but also increase public spending on welfare ben-
efits and lower refugees’ tax contributions. Overall, the results
suggest that redesigning placement policies to maximize the syn-
ergies between refugees and existing immigrant networks could
bring benefits for both refugees and host societies (25).
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